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Abstract—We consider a sequence of transferable util-
ity (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic
function is a random vector with realizations restricted to
some set of values. The first part of the paper contributes
to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and
the development of a distributed bargaining protocol.
We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the
bargaining process to a random allocation that lies in
the core of the robust game under some mild conditions
on the underlying communication graphs. The second
part of the paper addresses the more general case where
the robust game may have empty core. In this case, with
the dynamic game we associate a dynamic average game
by averaging over time the sequence of characteristic
functions. Then, we consider an accordingly modified
bargaining protocol. Assuming that the sequence of
characteristic functions is ergodic and the core of the
average game has a nonempty relative interior, we show
that the modified bargaining protocol converges with
probability 1 to a random allocation that lies in the core
of the average game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU)
have been introduced by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [25]. A coalitional TU game constitutes of a set
of players, who can form coalitions, and a character-
istic function that provides a value for each coalition.
Coalitional TU games have been used to model coop-
eration in supply chain applications [8], network flow
applications [1] and communication networks [22].
In this paper, the game is played repeatedly over
time thus generating a sequence of time varying char-
acteristic functions. We refer to such a repeated game
as dynamic coalitional TU game. Our main objective
is to explore distributed agreement on solutions in
the core of the game, where the players interact only
with their neighbors. At every iteration, a player i
observes the allocations of some of his neighbors. This
is modeled using a directed graph with the set of
players as the vertex set and a time-varying edge set
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composed of directed links (i, j) whenever player i
observes the allocation vector proposed by player j
at time t. We refer to this directed graph as players’
neighbor-graph. Given a player’s neighbor-graph, each
player i negotiates allocations by adjusting the alloca-
tions he received from his neighbors through weight
assignments. The player selects a new allocation by
projecting the balanced allocation on his bounding set.
We propose such bargaining protocols for solving both
the robust and the average TU game. For each of
these games, we use some mild assumptions on the
connectivity of the players’ neighbor-graph. Assum-
ing that the core of the robust game is nonempty,
we show that our bargaining protocol converges with
probability 1 to a common (random) allocation in
the core. In the case when the core of the robust
game is empty, we consider an average game that can
provide a meaningful solution under some conditions
on the sequence of the characteristic functions. This is
a new contribution with respect to the conference paper
[12]. Specifically, in this case, we consider a dynamic
average game by averaging over time the sequence of
characteristic functions. We then modify accordingly
the bounding set and the associated bargaining process
by using the dynamic average game. This means that
the value constraints are defined by using the time-
averaged sequence rather than the sequence of random
characteristic functions. Under the assumptions that the
time-averaged sequence is ergodic and that the core
of the average game has a nonempty relative interior,
we show that the players’ allocations generated by our
bargaining protocol converge with probability 1 to a
common (random) allocation in the core of the average
game. Averaging coalitions’ values is a way to capture
players’ patience and allocation fairness. Patience in
bargaining games is a crucial aspect and has inspired
a number of different models (see, for instance, Section
3.10.2 in [17] and Chapter 7, p.126 in [25]). Averaged
(payoff) values are also among the foundations of the
”approachability theory” [5].
The work in this paper is related to stochastic
cooperative games [23]. However, the existence of a
players’ neighbor-graph, of multiple iterations in the
bargaining process, and the consideration of robust
game add new elements to the model. Bringing dy-
2namical aspects into the framework of coalitional TU
games is an element in common with papers [7], [9].
However, unlike [7], [9], the values of the coalitions
in this paper are realized exogenously and no relation
is assumed between consecutive samples. Dynamic
robust TU games have also been considered in [3],
[2] and [4]. Convergence of allocation processes is a
main topic in [11]. There, rewards are allocated by a
game designer repeatedly in a centralized manner and
based on the current excess rewards of the coalitions
(accumulated reward up to current time minus the
value of the coalition). Our approach, however, differs
from that of [11] as we resort to a decentralized
scheme where the allocation process is the result of
a bargaining process among the players with local
interactions. The work in this paper is also related
to the literature on agreement among multiple agents,
where an underlying communication graph for the
agents and balancing weights have been used with
some variations [24], [14] to reach an agreement on
common decision variable, as well as in [15], [16],
[20], [19] for distributed multi-agent optimization.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the game and provide motivations and
preliminary results. In Section III, we prove the con-
vergence results for the robust game. In Section IV, we
introduce the dynamic average game and the modified
bargaining protocol. In Section V, we report some nu-
merical simulations to illustrate our theoretical study,
and we conclude in Section VI.
Notation. We view vectors as columns. For a vector
x, we use xi or [x]i to denote its ith coordinate
component. For two vectors x and y, we use x < y
(x ≤ y) to denote xi < yi (xi ≤ yi) for all coordinate
indices i. We let x′ denote the transpose of a vector x,
and ‖x‖ denote its Euclidean norm. An n×n matrix A
is row-stochastic if the matrix has nonnegative entries
aij and
∑n
j=1 aij = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. For a matrix
A, we use aij or [A]ij to denote its ijth entry. A matrix
A is doubly stochastic if both A and its transpose A′
are row-stochastic. Given two sets U and S, we write
U ⊂ S to denote that U is a proper subset of S. We use
|S| for the cardinality of a given finite set S. We write
PX [x] to denote the projection of a vector x on a set X ,
and we write dist(x,X) for the distance from x to X ,
i.e., PX [x] = arg miny∈X ‖x − y‖ and dist(x,X) =
‖x−PX [x]‖, respectively. Given a set X and a scalar
λ ∈ R, the set λX is defined by λX , {λx | x ∈ X}.
Given two sets X,Y ⊆ Rn, the set sum X + Y is
defined by X + Y , {x+ y | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y }.
II. DYNAMIC TU GAME AND ROBUST GAME
In this section, we introduce the game and state some
basic assumptions. We also provide an example moti-
vating our development and establish some preliminary
results.
A. Basic Concepts of TU Games
A coalitional TU game involves a set N of players
and a value mapping η : 2N → R which is defined for
each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N (nonempty subset of
N ). The value mapping η is often referred to as value
(or characteristic) function, as it fully characterizes
the game. A TU game for a set N of players and a
characteristic function η is denoted by 〈N, η〉.
We let ηS denote the scalar value associated with
a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N under the characteristic
function η, i.e., ηS is the value of a coalition S in
the game 〈N, η〉. The value ηS could be thought of
as a monetary value that the players in coalition S
need to somehow divide among themselves. One of the
solution concepts in a TU game is the core of the game
which works under the premise that the best option for
players is to form a grand coalition N . The core of a
TU game 〈N, η〉 is denoted by C(η) and it is defined
as a collection of possible allocation vectors among the
players, as follows:
C(η) =
{
x ∈ R|N |
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈N
xi = ηN ,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ ηS
for all nonempty S ⊂ N
}
,
where xi ∈ R is an allocation value for player i ∈ N
and x = (x1, . . . , x|N |)T is an allocation vector. Thus,
the core C(η) of a game 〈N, η〉 consists of all possible
allocations xi to players i ∈ N such that the total sum
of allocation values xi is equal to the value ηN of the
grand coalition, which means that the grand coalition
is efficient. Furthermore, for every other nonempty
coalition S, the sum of allocations xi for players i ∈ S
is at least as large as the coalition value ηS , which
translates to interpretation of the grand coalition being
stable (i.e., no player has incentive to leave the grand
coalition). Given that the core C(η) of a TU game
〈N, η〉 is nonempty, the question that one needs to
address is to determine a protocol (bargaining process)
for the players that will render an allocation x˜ in the
core on which all players agree. We will investigate
this problem for dynamic TU games played among
players constrained to communicate locally over a
communication graph. The precise setting is described
in the next section.
B. Problem of our Interest and Bargaining Process
Consider a set of players N = {1, . . . , n} and the
set of all (nonempty) coalitions S ⊆ N arising among
these players. Let m = 2n − 1 be the number of
3possible coalitions. We assume that the time is discrete
and use t = 0, 1, 2, . . . to index the time slots.
We consider a dynamic TU game, denoted
〈N, {v(t)}〉, where {v(t)} is a sequence of charac-
teristic functions. Thus, in the dynamic TU game
〈N, {v(t)}〉, the players are involved in a sequence of
instantaneous TU games whereby, at each time t, the
instantaneous TU game is 〈N, v(t)〉 with v(t) ∈ Rm
for all t ≥ 0. Further, we let vS(t) denote the value
assigned to a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N in the
instantaneous game 〈N, v(t)〉. In what follows, we
deal with dynamic TU games where each characteristic
function v(t) is a random vector with realizations
restricted to some set of values.
In our development of robust TU game, we assume
that the grand coalition value vN (t) is deterministic for
every t ≥ 0, while the values vS(t) of the other coali-
tions S have a common upper bound. These conditions
are formally stated in the following assumption.
Assumption 1: There exists vmax ∈ Rm such that
for all t ≥ 0, we have vN (t) = vmaxN and vS(t) ≤ vmaxS
for all nonempty coalitions S ⊂ N .
We refer to the game 〈N, vmax〉 as robust game. In the
first part of this paper, we rely on the assumption that
the robust game has a nonempty core.
Assumption 2: We have C(vmax) 6= ∅.
An immediate consequence of Assumptions 1 and 2
is that the core C(v(t)) of the instantaneous game is
always nonempty. This follows from C(vmax) ⊆ C(η)
for any η satisfying ηN = vmaxN and ηS ≤ vmaxS for
S ⊂ N , and the assumption that C(vmax) 6= ∅.
Throughout the paper, we assume that each player i
is rational and efficient. This translates to each player
i ∈ N choosing his allocation vector within the set
of allocations satisfying value constraints of all the
coalitions that include player i. This set is referred to
as the bounding set of player i and, for a generic game
〈N, η〉, it is given by
Xi(η) =
{
x ∈ Rn |
∑
j∈N
xj = ηN ,
∑
j∈S
xj ≥ ηS
for all S ⊂ N s.t. i ∈ S
}
.
Note that each Xi(η) is polyhedral.
We find it suitable to represent the bounding sets
and the core in alternative equivalent forms. Let eS ∈
Rn be the incidence vector for a nonempty coalition
S ⊆ N , i.e., the vector with the coordinates given by
[eS ]i =
{
1 if i ∈ S,
0 else.
Then, the bounding sets and the core can be repre-
sented as follows:
Xi(η) = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = ηN , e′Sx ≥ ηS
for all S ⊂ N with i ∈ S}, (1)
Fig. 1. Players’ neighbor graphs for 6 players and two different
time instances.
C(η) = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = ηN , e′Sx ≥ ηS
for all nonempty S ⊂ N}. (2)
Furthermore, observe that the core C(η) of the game
coincides with the intersection of the bounding sets
Xi(η) of all players i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}, i.e.,
C(η) = ∩ni=1Xi(η). (3)
We now discuss the bargaining protocol where re-
peatedly over time each player i ∈ N submits an
allocation vector that the player would agree on. The
allocation vector proposed by player i at time t is
denoted by xi(t) ∈ Rn, where the jth component xij(t)
represents the amount that player i would assign to
player j. To simplify the notation in the dynamic game
〈N, {v(t)}〉, we let Xi(t) denote the bounding set of
player i for the instantaneous game 〈N, v(t)〉, i.e., for
all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0,
Xi(t) =
{
x ∈ Rn |∑j∈N xj = vN (t),∑
j∈S xj ≥ vS(t) for all S ⊂ N s.t. i ∈ S
}
.
(4)
We assume that each player may observe the alloca-
tions of a subset of the other players at any time, which
are termed as the neighbors of the player. The players
and their neighbors at time t can be represented by a
directed graph G(t) = (N, E(t)), with the vertex set N
and the set E(t) of directed links. A link (i, j) ∈ E(t)
exists if player j is a neighbor of player i at time t.
We always assume that (i, i) ∈ E(t) for all t, which is
natural since every player i can always access its own
allocation vector. We refer to graph G(t) as a neighbor-
graph at time t. In the graph G(t), a player j is a
neighbor of player i (i.e., (i, j) ∈ E(t)) only if player
i can observe the allocation vector of player j at time
t. Figure 1 illustrates how the players’ neighbor-graph
may look at two time instances.
Given the players’ neighbor-graph G(t), each player
i negotiates allocations by averaging his allocation
and the allocations he received from his neighbors.
More precisely, at time t, the bargaining process for
each player i involves the player’s individual bounding
set Xi(t), its own allocation xi(t) and the observed
allocations xj(t) of some of his neighbors j. Formally,
we let Ni(t) be the set of neighbors of player i at time
t (including himself), i.e., Ni(t) = {j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈
4E(t)}. With this notation, the bargaining process is
given by, for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0:
xi(t+ 1) = PXi(t)
 ∑
j∈Ni(t)
aij(t)x
j(t)
 , (5)
where PXi(t)[·] is the projection onto the player i
bounding set Xi(t) and aij(t) ≥ 0 is a scalar weight
that player i assigns to the proposed allocation xj(t)
of a neighbor j ∈ Ni(t). The weights aij(t), j ∈ Ni(t)
are assumed to be deterministic scalars chosen by
player i (for example, see [15] for some specific
possible choices of aij(t), j ∈ Ni(t)). The initial
allocations xi(0), i = 1, . . . , n, are selected randomly
and independently of {v(t)}.
The bargaining process in (5) can be written com-
pactly by introducing zero weights for players j whose
allocations are not available to player i at time t.
Specifically by letting aij(t) = 0 for all j 6∈ Ni(t) and
all t, we have the following equivalent representation
of the bargaining process, for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0:
xi(t+ 1) = PXi(t)
 n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t)
 . (6)
We now discuss the specific assumptions on the
weights aij(t) and the players’ neighbor-graph that we
use. We let A(t) be the matrix with entries aij(t).
Assumption 3: Each matrix A(t) is doubly stochas-
tic with positive diagonal, and there exists a scalar
α > 0 such that aij(t) ≥ α whenever aij(t) > 0.
In view of the construction of matrices A(t), we see
that aij(t) ≥ α for j = i and perhaps for some players
j that are neighbors of player i. The requirement that
the positive weights are uniformly bounded away from
zero is imposed to ensure that the information from
each player diffuses in the network persistently in time.
The requirement on the doubly stochasticity of the
weights is used to ensure that in a long run each player
has equal influence on the limiting allocation vector.
It is natural to expect that the connectivity of the
players’ neighbor-graphs G(t) = (N, E(t)) impacts
the bargaining process. At any time, the instantaneous
graph G(t) need not be connected. However, for the
proper behavior of the bargaining process, the union
of the graphs G(t) over a period of time is assumed to
be connected.
Assumption 4: There is an integer Q ≥ 1 such that
the graph
(
N,
⋃(t+1)Q−1
τ=tQ E(τ)
)
is strongly connected
for every t ≥ 0.
Assumptions 3 and 4 together guarantee that the
players communicate sufficiently often to ensure that
the information of each player is persistently dif-
fused over the network in time to reach every other
player. Under these assumptions, we will study the
dynamic bargaining process in (6). We want to provide
conditions under which the process converges to an
allocation in the core of the robust game. Before this,
we give a motivating example in the following section.
C. Motivations
Dynamic coalitional games capture coordination in
a number of network flow applications. Network flows
model flow of goods, materials, or other resources
between different production/distribution sites [1]. In
communication networks, or more generally in self-
organizing, decentralized, and autonomic networks,
coalitional games prove to be a very powerful tool
for designing fair, robust, practical, and efficient co-
operation strategies (see [22], p.93). A first example
is the rate allocation in a multiple access channel. Here
the bargaining process involves the users who aim at
obtaining a fair allocation of the total transmission
rate available. If a user, or coalition of users receives
an unfair allocation, it will adopt a selfish behavior
thus reducing the efficiency of the global network.
Other applications arise in receivers and transmitters
cooperation, or packet forwarding ad hoc networks.
We refer the reader to the tutorial [22] for a more
detailed discussion on the use of coalitional games in
engineering applications.
We next provide a supply chain application that
justifies the model under study.
A single warehouse v0 serves a number of retailers
vi, i = 1, . . . , n, each one facing a demand di(t)
unknown but bounded by pre assigned values dmini ∈ R
and dmaxi ∈ R at any time period t ≥ 0. After demand
di(t) has been realized, retailer vi must choose to
either fulfill the demand or not. The retailers do not
hold any private inventory and, therefore, if they wish
to fulfill their demands, they must reorder goods from
the central warehouse. Retailers benefit from joint re-
orders as they may share the total transportation cost K
(this cost could also be time and/or players dependent).
In particular, if retailer vi “plays” individually, the
cost of reordering coincides with the full transportation
cost K. Actually, when necessary a single truck will
serve only him and get back to the warehouse. This
is illustrated by the dashed path (v0,v1,v0) in the
network of Figure 2(a). The cost of not reordering is
the cost of the unfulfilled demand di(t).
If two or more retailers “play” in a coalition, they
agree on a joint decision (“everyone reorders” or
“no one reorders”). The cost of reordering for the
coalition also equals the total transportation cost that
must be shared among the retailers. When necessary
a single truck will serve all retailers in the coalition
and get back to the warehouse. This is illustrated, with
reference to coalition {v1,v2} by the dashed path
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(a) Truck leaving v0, serv-
ing v1 and returning to v0.
v1
v2
v3
v0
(b) Truck leaving v0, serv-
ing v1 and v2, and then
returning to v0.
v1
v2
v3
v0
(c) Truck leaving v0, serv-
ing v1, v2, and v3, and
then returning to v0.
Fig. 2. Example of one warehouse v0 and three retailers v1,
v2 and v3.
(v0,v1,v2,v0) in Figure 2(b). A similar comment
applies to the coalition {v1,v2,v3} and the path
(v0,v1,v2,v3,v0) in Figure 2(c). The cost of not
reordering is the sum of the unfulfilled demands of all
retailers. How the players will share the cost is a part
of the solution generated by the bargaining process.
The cost scheme can be captured by a game with
the set N = {v1, . . . ,vn} of players where the cost
of a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N is given by
cS(t) = min
{
K,
∑
i∈S
di(t)
}
.
Note that the bounds on the demand di(t) reflect into
the bounds on the cost as follows: for all nonempty
S ⊆ N and t ≥ 0,
min
{
K,
∑
i∈S
dmini
}
≤ cS(t) ≤ min
{
K,
∑
i∈S
dmaxi
}
.
(7)
To complete the derivation of the coalitions’ values we
need to compute the cost savings vS(t) of a coalition
S as the difference between the sum of the costs of the
coalitions of the individual players in S and the cost
of the coalition itself, namely,
vS(t) =
∑
i∈S
c{i}(t)− cS(t).
Given the bound for cS(t) in (7), the value vS(t) is
also bounded, as given: for any S ⊂ N and t ≥ 0,
vS(t) ≤
∑
i∈S
min {K, dmaxi } −min
{
K,
∑
i∈S
dmini
}
.
Thus, the cost savings (value) of each coalition is
bounded uniformly by a maximum value.
D. Preliminary Results
We derive some preliminary results pertinent to the
core of the robust game and some error bounds for
polyhedral sets applicable to the players’ bounding
sets Xi(t). We later use these results to establish the
convergence of the bargaining process in (6).
In our analysis we often use the following relation
that is valid for the projection operation on a closed
convex set X ⊆ Rn: for any w ∈ Rn and any x ∈ X ,
‖PX [w]− x‖2 ≤ ‖w − x‖2 − ‖PX [w]− w‖2. (8)
This property of the projection operation is known as
a strictly non-expansive projection property (see [6],
volume II, 12.1.13 Lemma on page 1120).
We next prove a result that relates the distance
dist(x,C(η)) between a point x and the core C(η)
with the distances dist(x,Xi(η)) between x and the
bounding sets Xi(η). This result will be crucial in our
later development. The result relies on the polyhedral-
ity of the bounding sets Xi(η) and the core C(η), as
given in (1) and (2) respectively, and a special relation
for polyhedral sets. This special relation states that for
a nonempty polyhedral set P = {x ∈ Rn | a′`x ≤
b`, ` = 1, . . . , r}, there exists a scalar c > 0 such that
dist(x,P) ≤ c
r∑
`=1
dist(x,H`) for all x ∈ Rn, (9)
where H` = {x ∈ Rn | a′`x ≤ b`} and the
scalar c depends on the vectors a`, ` = 1, . . . , r only.
Relation (9) has been established by Hoffman [10] and
is known as Hoffman bound.
Aside from the Hoffman bound, in establishing the
forthcoming Lemma 1, we also use the fact that the
square distance from a point x to a closed convex set
X contained in an affine set H is given by
dist2(x,X) = ‖x−PH [x]‖2+dist2(PH [x], X), (10)
which is illustrated in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Projection on a set X contained in an affine set H .
Now, we are ready to present the result relating the
values dist2(x,C(η)) and dist2(x,Xi(η)).
6Lemma 1: Let 〈N, η〉 be a TU game with a
nonempty core C(η). Then, there is a constant µ > 0
such that, for all x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ µ
n∑
i=1
dist2(x,Xi(η)),
where µ depends on the collection of vectors {e˜S |
S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅} with each e˜S being the projection of
eS on the hyperplane H = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = ηN}.
Proof: Since the hyperplane H contains the core
C(η) (see (2)), by relation (10) we have for all x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) =‖x− PH [x]‖2
+ dist2(PH [x], C(η)). (11)
The point PH [x] and the core C(η) lie in the (n− 1)-
dimensional affine set H . By applying the Hoffman
bound relative to the affine set H (cf. (9)), we obtain
dist(PH [x], C(η)) ≤ c
∑
S⊂N
dist(PH [x], H ∩HS),
where the summation is over nonempty subsets S and
HS = {x ∈ Rn | e′Sx ≥ ηS}. The constant c depends
on the collection {e˜S , S ⊂ N} of projections of vectors
eS on the hyperplane H for S ⊂ N . Thus, it follows
dist2(PH [x], C(η))
≤ c2 (∑S⊂N dist(PH [x], H ∩HS))2
≤ c2(m− 1) ∑S⊂N dist2(PH [x], H ∩HS),
(12)
where m is the number of nonempty subsets of N . The
last inequality follows by (
∑`
j=1 aj)
2 ≤ `∑`j=1 a2j ,
which is valid for any collection of scalars aj , j =
1, . . . , ` with ` ≥ 1. Combining Eq. (12) with equal-
ity (11), we obtain for any x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ ‖x− PH [x]‖2
+c2(m− 1) ∑S⊂N dist2(PH [x], H ∩HS)
≤ c1
∑
S⊂N
(‖x− PH [x]‖2 + dist2(PH [x], H ∩HS)) ,
where c1 = max{1, c2(m − 1)}. Since the set H is
affine, in view of relation (10) we have ‖x−PH [x]‖2+
dist2(PH [x], H ∩HS) = dist2(x,H ∩HS), implying
that for any x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ c1
∑
S⊂N
dist2(x,H ∩HS).
From the preceding relation it follows for all x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ c1
∑
S⊂N
|S|dist2(x,H ∩HS), (13)
where |S| denotes the cardinality of the coalition S.
Note that∑
S⊂N |S|dist2(x,H ∩HS)
=
∑
S⊂N
∑
i∈S dist
2(x,H ∩HS)
=
∑n
i=1
(∑
{S⊂N |i∈S} dist
2(x,H ∩HS)
)
.
(14)
We also note that Xi(η) ⊂ H∩HS for each nonempty
S ⊂ N and i ∈ S, which follows by the definition of
HS and relation (1). Furthermore, since dist(x, Y ) ≤
dist(x,X) for any x ∈ Rn and for any two closed
convex sets X,Y ⊆ Rn such that X ⊂ Y , it follows
that, for all x ∈ Rn
dist(x,H ∩HS) ≤ dist(x,Xi(η)). (15)
By combining relations (13)–(15), we obtain
dist2(x,C(η))
≤ c1
∑n
i=1
(∑
{S⊂N |i∈S} dist
2(x,Xi(η))
)
= c1κ
∑n
i=1 dist
2(x,Xi(η)),
(16)
where κ is the number of coalitions S that contain
player i, which is the same number for every player
(κ does not depend on i). The desired relation follows
by letting µ = c1κ, and by recalling that c1 =
max{1, c2(m−1)}, where c depends on the projections
e˜S of vectors eS , S ⊂ N , on the hyperplane H .
Note that the scalar µ in Lemma 1 does not depend
on the coalitions’ values ηS for S 6= N . It depends
only on the vectors eS , S ⊆ N , and the grand coalition
value ηN .
As a direct consequence of Lemma 1, we have the
following result for the instantaneous game 〈N, v(t)〉
under the assumptions of Section II-B.
Lemma 2: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. We then
have for all t ≥ 0, x ∈ Rn
dist2(x,C(v(t))) ≤ µ
n∑
i=1
dist2(x,Xi(t))
where C(v(t)) is the core of the game 〈N, v(t)〉, Xi(t)
is the bounding set of player i, and µ is the constant
from Lemma 1.
Proof: By Assumption 2, the core C(vmax) is
nonempty. Furthermore, under Assumption 1, we have
C(vmax) ⊆ C(v(t)) for all t ≥ 0, implying that
the core C(v(t)) is nonempty for all t ≥ 0. Un-
der Assumption 1, each core C(v(t)) is defined by
the same affine equality corresponding to the grand
coalition value, e′Nx = v
max
N . Moreover, each core
C(v(t)) is defined through the set of hyperplanes
HS(t) = {x ∈ Rn | e′Sx ≥ vS(t)}, S ⊂ N , which
have time invariant normal vectors eS , S ⊆ N . Thus,
the result follows from Lemma 1.
III. CONVERGENCE TO CORE OF ROBUST GAME
In this section, we prove convergence of the bargain-
ing process in (6) to a random allocation that lies in
the core of the robust game with probability 1. We find
it convenient to re-write the bargaining protocol (6) by
7isolating a linear and a non-linear term. The linear term
is the vector wi(t) defined as:
wi(t) =
n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t) for all i ∈ N , t ≥ 0. (17)
Note that wi(t) is linear in players’ allocations xj(t).
The non-linear term is the error
ei(t) = PXi(t)[w
i(t)]− wi(t). (18)
Now, using (17) and (18), we can rewrite protocol (6)
as follows:
xi(t+1) = wi(t)+ei(t) for all i ∈ N , t ≥ 0. (19)
The main result of this section shows that, with prob-
ability 1, the bargaining protocol (17)–(19) converges
to the core C(vmax) of the robust game 〈N, vmax〉,
provided that v(t) = vmax happens infinitely often in
time with probability 1. To establish this, we use some
auxiliary results, as given in the following two lemmas.
The first lemma provides a property of the sequences
xi(t) and shows that the errors ei(t) are diminishing.
Lemma 3: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Also,
assume that each matrix A(t) is doubly stochastic.
Then, for the bargaining protocol (17)–(19), we have
(a) The sequence
{∑n
i=1 ‖xi(t+ 1)− x‖2
}
con-
verges for every x ∈ C(vmax).
(b) The errors ei(t) in (18) are such that∑∞
t=0
∑n
j=1 ‖ei(t)‖2 < ∞. In particular,
limt→∞ ‖ei(t)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Proof: By xi(t+1) = PXi(t)[w
i(t)] and by strictly
non-expansive property of the Euclidean projection on
a closed convex set Xi(t) (see (8)), we have for any
i ∈ N , t ≥ 0 and x ∈ Xi(t),
‖xi(t+ 1)− x‖2 ≤ ‖wi(t)− x‖2 − ‖ei(t)‖2. (20)
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have C(vmax) ⊆
C(v(t)) for all t ≥ 0. Furthermore, since C(v(t)) =
∩ni=1Xi(t), it follows that C(vmax) ⊆ Xi(t) for all
i ∈ N and t ≥ 0. Therefore, relation (20) holds for all
x ∈ C(vmax). Thus, by summing the relations in (20)
over i ∈ N , we obtain for all t ≥ 0 and x ∈ C(vmax),
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
‖wi(t)− x‖2
−
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2). (21)
By the definition of wi(t) in (17), using the
stochasticity of A(t) and the convexity of the
squared norm, we obtain
∑n
i=1 ‖wi(t) − x‖2 ≤∑n
j=1 (
∑n
i=1 aij(t)) ‖xj(t)− x‖2. Since A(t) is dou-
bly stochastic, we have
∑n
i=1 aij(t) = 1 for all j,
implying
∑n
i=1 ‖wi(t) − x‖2 ≤
∑n
i=1 ‖xi(t) − x‖2.
By substituting this relation in (21), we arrive at
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t)− x‖2
−
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2. (22)
Relation (22) shows that the scalar sequence
{∑ni=1 ‖xi(t + 1) − x‖2} is non-increasing for any
given x ∈ C(vmax). Thus, the sequence must be con-
vergent. Moreover, by summing the relations in (22)
over t = 0, . . . , s and taking the limit as s → ∞,
we obtain
∑∞
t=0
∑n
i=1 ‖ei(t)‖2 ≤
∑n
i=1 ‖xi(0)−x‖2,
implying that limt→∞ ei(t) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
In our next result, we use the instantaneous average
of players’ allocations, defined as follows:
y(t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xj(t) for all t ≥ 0.
The result shows that the difference between the bar-
gaining payoff vector xi(t) for any player i and the
average y(t) of these payoffs converges to 0 as time
goes to infinity. The proof essentially uses the line of
analysis that has been employed in [16], where the
sets Xi(t) are static in time, i.e., Xi(t) = Xi for all
t. In addition, we also use the rate result for doubly
stochastic matrices that has been established in [14].
Lemma 4: Let Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Suppose
that for the bargaining protocol (17)–(19) we have
limt→∞ ‖ei(t)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N. Then, for every
player i ∈ N we have
lim
t→∞ ‖x
i(t)−y(t)‖ = 0, lim
t→∞ ‖w
i(t)−y(t)‖ = 0.
Proof: For any t ≥ s ≥ 0, define matrices
Φ(t, s) = A(t)A(t− 1) · · ·A(s+ 1)A(s),
with Φ(t, t) = A(t). Using the matrices Φ(t, s) and the
expression for xi(t) in (19), we can relate the vectors
xi(t) with the vectors xi(s) at a time s for 0 ≤ s ≤
t− 1, as follows:
xi(t) =
∑n
j=1[Φ(t− 1, s)]ij xj(s)
+
∑t−1
r=s+1
(∑n
j=1[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij ej(r − 1)
)
+ei(t− 1).
(23)
Under the doubly stochasticity of the matrices A(t),
using y(t) = 1n
∑n
j=1 x
j(t) and relation (23), we
obtain, for all t ≥ s ≥ 0
y(t) = 1n
∑n
j=1 x
j(s)
+ 1n
∑t
r=s+1
(∑n
j=1 e
j(r − 1)
)
.
(24)
By our assumption, we have limt→∞ ‖ei(t)‖ = 0 for
all i. Thus, for any  > 0, there is an integer sˆ ≥ 0
8such that ‖ei(t)‖ ≤  for all t ≥ sˆ and all i. Using
relations (23) and (24) with s = sˆ, we obtain for all i
and t ≥ sˆ+ 1,
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
j=1
(
[Φ(t− 1, sˆ)]ij − 1
n
)
xj(sˆ)
+
t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
n∑
j=1
(
[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij − 1
n
)
ej(r − 1)
+
(
ei(t− 1)− 1
n
n∑
j=1
ej(t− 1)
)∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, sˆ)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣ ‖xj(sˆ)‖
+
t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣‖ej(r − 1)‖
+‖ei(t− 1)‖+ 1
n
n∑
j=1
‖ej(t− 1)‖.
Since ‖ei(t)‖ ≤  for all t ≥ sˆ and all i, it follows that
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, sˆ)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣ ‖xj(sˆ)‖
+
t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣ + 2.
Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the following result
holds for the matrices Φ(t, s), as shown in [13] (see
there Corollary 1), for all t ≥ s ≥ 0:∣∣∣∣[Φ(t, s)]ij − 1n
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1− α4n2)d
t−s+1
Q e−2
.
Substituting the preceding estimate in the estimate for
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖, we obtain
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤
(
1− α
4n2
)d t−sˆQ e−2 n∑
j=1
‖xj(sˆ)‖
+n
t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
(
1− α
4n2
)d t−rQ e−2
+ 2.
Letting t→∞, we see that
lim supt→∞ ‖xi(t)− y(t)‖
≤ n∑∞r=sˆ+1 (1− α4n2 )d t−rQ e−2 + 2.
Note that
∑∞
r=sˆ+1
(
1− α4n2
)d t−rQ e−2 <∞, which by
the arbitrary choice of  yields
lim
t→∞ ‖x
i(t)− y(t)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N.
Now, we focus on
∑n
i=1 ‖wi(t) − y(t)‖. Since
wi(t) =
∑n
j=1 aij(t)x
j(t) and since A(t) is doubly
stochastic, it can be seen that
n∑
i=1
‖wi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤
n∑
j=1
‖xj(t)− y(t)‖.
Since limt→∞ ‖xj(t)− y(t)‖ = 0 for all j, it follows
that
∑n
i=1 ‖wi(t)−y(t)‖ → 0, thus implying ‖wi(t)−
y(t)‖ → 0 for all i ∈ N .
Lemma 4 captures the effects of the matrices A(t)
that represent players’ neighbor-graphs. At the same
time, Lemma 3 is basically a consequence of the
projection property only. So far, the polyhedrality of
the sets Xi(t) has not been used at all. We now put
all pieces together, namely Lemma 2 that exploits the
polyhedrality of the bounding sets Xi(t), Lemma 3
and Lemma 4. This brings us to the following result
for the robust game.
Theorem 1: Consider a robust TU game 〈N, vmax〉,
and let Assumptions 1–4 hold. Also, assume that
Prob {v(t) = vmax i.o.} = 1, where i.o. stands for
infinitely often. Then, the players allocations xi(t)
generated by bargaining protocol (17)–(19) converge
with probability 1 to an allocation in the core C(vmax),
i.e., there is a random vector x˜ ∈ C(vmax) such
that limt→∞ ‖xi(t) − x˜‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N with
probability 1.
Proof: By Lemma 3, for each player i ∈ N , the
sequence {∑ni=1 ‖xi(t)−x‖2} is convergent for every
x ∈ C(vmax) and the errors ei(t) are diminishing, i.e.,
‖ei(t)‖ → 0. Then, by Lemma 4 we have ‖xi(t) −
y(t)‖ → 0 for every i. Hence, for every x ∈ C(vmax)
{‖y(t)− x‖} is convergent. (25)
We want to show that {y(t)} is convergent and that
its limit is in the core C(vmax) with probability 1. For
this, we note that since xi(t+ 1) ∈ Xi(t), it holds, for
all t ≥ 0
n∑
i=1
dist2 (y(t+ 1), Xi(t)) ≤
n∑
i=1
‖y(t+1)−xi(t+1)‖2.
The preceding relation and ‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ → 0 for all
i ∈ N (cf. Lemma 4) imply that
lim
t→∞
n∑
i=1
dist2 (y(t+ 1), Xi(t)) = 0.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, by Lemma 2 we obtain,
for all t ≥ 0,
dist2 (y(t+ 1), C(v(t))) ≤ µ
n∑
i=1
dist2 (y(t+ 1), Xi(t)) .
By combining the preceding two relations we see that
lim
t→∞ dist
2 (y(t+ 1), C(v(t))) = 0. (26)
9By our assumption, the event {v(t) =
vmax infinitely often} happens with probability 1.
We now fix a realization {vω(t)} of the sequence
{v(t)} such that vω(t) = vmax holds infinitely often
(for infinitely many t’s). Let {tk} be a sequence
such that vω(tk) = vmax for all k. All the variables
corresponding to the realization {vω(t)} are denoted
by a subscript ω. By relation (25) the sequence {yω(t)}
is bounded, therefore {yω(tk)} is bounded. Without
loss of generality (by passing to a subsequence of
{tk} if necessary), we assume that {yω(tk)} converges
to some vector y˜ω , i.e., limk→∞ yω(tk) = y˜ω. This
and Eq. (26) imply that y˜ω ∈ C(vmax). Then,
by relation (25), we have that {‖yω(t) − y˜ω‖} is
convergent, from which we conclude that y˜ω must
be the unique accumulation point of the sequence
{yω(t)}, i.e.,
lim
t→∞ yω(t) = y˜ω, y˜ω ∈ C(v
max). (27)
Since (27) is true for every realization ω such
that vω(t) = vmax holds infinitely often and since
Prob {v(t) = vmax i.o.} = 1, it follows that the
sequence {y(t)} converges with probability 1 to a
random point y˜ ∈ C(vmax). By Lemma 4 we have
‖xi(t) − y(t)‖ → 0 for every i. Thus, the sequences
{xi(t)}, i = 1, . . . , n, converge with probability 1 to a
common random point in the core C(vmax).
IV. DYNAMIC AVERAGE GAME
When the core of the robust game is empty, the
core of the instantaneous average game can provide
a meaningful solution under some conditions on the
distribution of the functions v(t). Averaging coalitions’
values is a way to capture players’ patience and
allocation fairness. Actually, if players have memory,
they consider not only the coalitions’ values at the
present time, but also all past values. Past values are
then used to filter out potential peaks of the values thus
leading the players to accept less (more) than what they
expect when peaks are positive (negative). Patience in
bargaining games is a crucial aspect and has inspired a
number of different models (see, for instance, Section
3.10.2 in [17] and Chapter 7, p.126 in [25]). The use
of averaged (payoff) values intersects different areas of
game theory. In two player repeated games with vector
payoffs, for instance, one player looks for strategies
that lead the long-run average payoff to converge to a
so called approachable set, despite the influence of the
opponent. This stream of literature, which builds upon
the idea of ”averaged payoff” goes under the name
of ”approachability theory” (see the seminal paper
by D. Blackwell [5]) and the Blackwell’s theorem is
rewarded as the extension to an n-dimensional payoff
space of the Von Neumann min-max theorem.
In what follows, we focus on the instantaneous
average game associated with the dynamic TU game
〈N, {v(t)}〉. In the next sections, we define the in-
stantaneous average game, we introduce a bargaining
protocol for the game and investigate the convergence
properties of the bargaining protocol.
A. Average Game and Bargaining Protocol
Consider a dynamic TU game 〈N, {v(t)}〉 with
each v(t) being a random characteristic function. With
the dynamic game we associate a dynamic average
game 〈N, {v¯(t)}〉, where v¯(t) is the average of the
characteristic functions v(0), . . . , v(t), i.e.,
v¯(t) =
1
t+ 1
t∑
k=0
v(k) for all t ≥ 0.
An instantaneous average game at time t is the game
〈N, v¯(t)〉. We let C(v¯(t)) denote the core of the instan-
taneous average game at time t and let X¯i(t) denote
the bounding set of player i for the instantaneous game
〈N, v¯(t)〉, i.e., for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0,
X¯i(t) =
{
x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = v¯N (t), e′Sx ≥ v¯S(t)
for all S ⊂ N s. t. i ∈ S
}
. (28)
Note that X¯i(0) = Xi(0) for all i ∈ N since
v¯(0) = v(0). In what follows, we assume that X¯i(t)
are nonempty for all i ∈ N and all t ≥ 0.
In this setting, the bargaining process for the players
is given by, for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0,
xi(t+ 1) = PX¯i(t)
 n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t)
 , (29)
where aij(t) ≥ 0 is a scalar weight that player
i assigns to the proposed allocation xj(t) received
from player j at time t. The initial allocations xi(0),
i ∈ N , are selected randomly and independently of
{v(t)}. Regarding the weights aij(t), recall that these
weights are reflective of the players’ neighbor-graph:
aij(t) = 0 for all j 6∈ Ni(t), where Ni(t) is the set
of neighbors of player i (including himself) at time t,
while we may have aij(t) ≥ 0 only for j ∈ Ni(t).
B. Assumptions and Preliminaries
In this section, we provide our assumptions for the
average game, and discuss some auxiliary results that
we need later on in the convergence analysis of the bar-
gaining protocol. Regarding the random characteristic
functions v(t) we use the following assumption.
Assumption 5: We have limt→∞ v¯(t) = vmean for
some vmean ∈ Rm and vN (t) = vmeanN for all t, both
with probability 1.
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Assumption 5 basically says that {v(t)} is ergodic,
and the grand coalition value vN (t) is constant with
probability 1. The assumption is satisfied, for example,
when {vS(t)} is an independent identically distributed
with a finite expectation E[vS(t)] for all S ⊂ N .
We refer to the TU game 〈N, vmean〉 as average
game, which is well defined under Assumption 5. We
let C(vmean) be the core of the average game and X¯i
be the bounding set for player i in the game, i.e.,
C(vmean) =
{
x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = vmeanN , e′Sx ≥ vmeanS
for all nonempty S ⊂ N
}
,
X¯i =
{
x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = vmeanN , e′Sx ≥ vmeanS
for all S ⊂ N with i ∈ S
}
. (30)
The average core C(vmean) lies in the hyperplane H =
{x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = vmeanN }. Hence, the dimension of the
core is at most n− 1. We will in fact assume that the
dimension of the average core is n−1, by requiring the
existence of a point that satisfies all other inequalities
defining the core as strict inequalities. Specifically, we
make use of the following assumption.
Assumption 6: There exists a vector zˆ ∈ C(vmean)
such that e′S zˆ > v
mean
S for all nonempty S ⊂ N.
Assumption 6 basically says that zˆ is in the relative
interior of the core C(vmean) of the average game
and the core C(vmean) has dimension n − 1. This
assumption is used to ensure that the cores C(v¯(t))
have a meaningful ”limit set”, as t→∞, and therefore,
something can be said about the convergence of the
bargaining protocol (29). In particular, the following
result is an immediate consequence of Assumption 6
and the polyhedrality of the cores C(v¯(t)).
Lemma 5: Let Assumptions 5 and 6 hold. Then,
with probability 1, for every z in relative interior of
C(vmean) there exists tz large enough such that z is
in the relative interior of C(v¯(t)) for all t ≥ tz with
probability 1.
Proof: Let z be in the relative interior of C(vmean)
which exists by Assumption 6. Thus, e′Nz = v
mean
N and
e′Sz > v
mean
S for all S ⊂ N . By Assumption 5, with
probability 1 we have v¯N (t) = vmeanN and v¯S(t) →
vmeanS for S ⊂ N . Hence, v¯N (t)′z = (vmeanN )′z for
all t with probability 1. Furthermore, there exists a
random time tz large enough so that with probability
1, e′Sz > v¯S(t) for all S ⊂ N and all t ≥ tz , implying
that z is in the relative interior of C(v¯(t)) for all t ≥ tz
with probability 1.
Lemma 5 shows that the sets C(v¯(t) and C(vmean)
have the same dimension for large enough t with
probability 1. In particular, this lemma implies that the
cores C(v¯(t)) are nonempty with probability 1 for all
t sufficiently large.
Aside from Lemma 5, in our convergence analysis of
the bargaining protocol, we use two additional results.
One of them is the well-known super-martingale con-
vergence theorem due to Robbins and Siegmund [21]
(it can also be found in [18], Chapter 2.2, Lemma 11).
Theorem 2: Let {Vk}, {gk}, and {hk} be non-
negative random scalar sequences. Let Fk be the σ-
algebra generated by V1, . . . , Vk, g1, . . . gk, h1, . . . hk.
Suppose that almost surely, E[Vk+1 | Fk] ≤ Vk − gk +
hk for all k, and
∑
k hk < ∞ almost surely. Then,
almost surely both the sequence {Vk} converges to a
non-negative random variable and
∑
k gk <∞.
The other result that we use is pertinent to two
nonempty polyhedral sets whose description differs
only in the right-hand side vector.
Lemma 6: Let Xb and Xb˜ be two polyhedral sets
given by Xb = {x ∈ Rn | Bx ≤ b} and Xb˜ = {x ∈
Rn | Bx ≤ b˜}, where B is an m × n matrix and
b, b˜ ∈ Rm. Then, there is a scalar L > 0 such that for
every b, b˜ ∈ Rm for which Xb 6= ∅ and Xb˜ 6= ∅, we
have, for any x ∈ Rn
dist(x,Xb) ≤ dist(x,Xb˜) + L‖b− b˜‖,
where the constant L depends on the matrix B.
Proof: We start from the triangle inequality ‖x−
y‖ ≤ ‖x − z‖ + ‖z − y‖ for arbitrary vectors x, y,
and z. By taking the infimum over y ∈ Xb, we
have dist(x,Xb) ≤ ‖x − z‖ + dist(z,Xb) for all
x, z ∈ Rn. Then, by letting z be the projection of x on
the set Xb˜, we obtain dist(x,Xb) ≤ dist(x,Xb˜) +
dist(PXb˜ [x], Xb). To estimate dist(PXb˜ [x], Xb), we
use the following relation
dist(y,Xb) ≤ L‖b− b˜‖ for any y ∈ Xb˜,
(see [6], 3.2.5 Corollary, pages 258–259). Since PXb˜ [x]
is in the set Xb˜, we have dist(PXb˜ [x], Xb) ≤ L‖b− b˜‖,
and the desired relation follows.
C. Convergence to Core of Average Game
We show the convergence of the bargaining protocol
to the core of the average game. In our analysis, we find
it convenient to re-write the bargaining protocol (29)
in an equivalent form by separating a linear and a non-
linear term. The linear term is given by vector w¯i(t):
w¯i(t) =
n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t) for all i ∈ N and t. (31)
The non-linear term is expressed by the error
e¯i(t) = PX¯i(t)[w¯
i(t)]− w¯i(t). (32)
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Now, using relations (31) and (32), we can rewrite (29)
as follows, for all i ∈ N and all t ≥ 0:
xi(t+ 1) = w¯i(t) + e¯i(t). (33)
We first show some basic properties of the players’
allocations by using the preceding equivalent descrip-
tion of the bargaining protocol (29). This properties
hold under the doubly stochasticity of the weights
aij(t) that comprise the matrix A(t).
Lemma 7: Let Assumptions 5 and 6 hold. Also, let
the matrices A(t) be doubly stochastic. Then, for bar-
gaining protocol (31)–(33), we have with probability 1:
(a) The sequence {∑ni=1 ‖xi(t+1)−z‖2} converges
for every z in the relative interior of C(vmean).
(b) The errors e¯i(t) in (18) are such that∑∞
t=0
∑n
j=1 ‖e¯i(t)‖2 < ∞. In particular,
limt→∞ ‖e¯i(t)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Proof: Let rintY denote the relative interior of a
set Y . Let z ∈ rintC(vmean) be arbitrary and fixed
for the rest of the proof. By Lemma 5, there exists tz
large enough such that z ∈ rintC(v¯(t)) for all t ≥ tz
with probability 1. Since C(v¯(t)) = ∩ni=1Xi(t), it
follows that z ∈ X¯i(t) for all i ∈ N and t ≥ tz
with probability 1. From xi(t + 1) = w¯i(t) + e¯i(t)
(cf. (33)), the definition of e¯i(t) in (32), and the
projection property given in Eq. (8), we have with
probability 1, for i ∈ N and all t ≥ tz ,
‖xi(t+ 1)− z‖2 ≤ ‖w¯i(t)− z‖2 − ‖e¯i(t)‖2.
Summing these relations over i ∈ N , and using
w¯i(t) =
∑n
j=1 aijx
i(t), the convexity of the norm and
the fact that A(t) is doubly stochastic, we obtain for
all t ≥ tz with probability 1,
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+1)−z‖2 ≤
n∑
j=1
‖xj(t)−z‖2−
n∑
j=1
‖e¯i(t)‖2.
Applying the super-martingale convergence theorem
(Theorem 2) (with an index shift), we see that the
sequence {∑ni=1 ‖xi(t + 1) − z‖2} is convergent and∑∞
t=tz
∑n
j=1 ‖e¯i(t)‖2 <∞ with probability 1. Hence,
the result in part (b) follows.
We observe that Lemma 4 applies to protocol (31)–
(33) in view of the analogy of the description of the
protocol in (17)–(19) and the protocol in (31)–(33).
We will re-state this lemma for an easier reference,
but without the proof since it is almost the same as
that of Lemma 4 (the proof in essence depends mainly
on the matrices A(k)).
Lemma 8: Let Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Suppose
that for the bargaining protocol (31)–(33) we have
limt→∞ ‖e¯i(t)‖ = 0 for all i with probability 1. Then,
for every player i ∈ N it holds with probability 1,
lim
t→∞ ‖x
i(t)−y(t)‖ = 0, lim
t→∞ ‖w¯
i(t)−y(t)‖ = 0,
where y(t) = 1n
∑n
j=1 x
j(t).
We are now ready to prove the convergence of the
bargaining protocol. We show this by combining the
protocol properties established in Lemmas 7 and 8.
Theorem 3: Let Assumptions 3–6 hold. Then, the
bargaining protocol (31)–(33) converges to a random
allocation in the core C(vmean) of the average game
with probability 1, i.e., limt→∞ ‖xi(t) − z˜‖ = 0 for
all i and some random vector z˜ ∈ C(vmean) with
probability 1.
Proof: By Lemma 7, with probability 1, the se-
quence {∑ni=1 ‖xi(t)−z‖2} is convergent for every z
in the relative interior of C(vmean) and ‖e¯i(t)‖ → 0
for each player i ∈ N . By Lemma 8, with probability 1
we have
lim
t→∞ ‖x
i(t)− y(t)‖ = 0 for every i ∈ N. (34)
Hence, with probability 1, for every z ∈ rintC(vmean)
{‖y(t)− z‖} is convergent. (35)
We next show that {y(t)} has accumulation points in
the core C(vmean) with probability 1. Since xi(t+1) ∈
X¯i(t), it follows∑n
i=1 dist
2
(
y(t+ 1), X¯i(t)
)
≤∑ni=1 ‖y(t+ 1)− xi(t+ 1)‖2. (36)
Relations (36) and (34) imply, with probability 1
lim
t→∞
n∑
i=1
dist2
(
y(t+ 1), X¯i(t)
)
= 0. (37)
The bounding sets X¯i are nonempty by Assumption 6
and the fact C(vmean) ⊂ X¯i for all i, while X¯i(t)
are assumed nonempty (see the discussion after rela-
tion (28)). Furthermore, since X¯i and X¯i(t) are two
polyhedral sets whose description differs only in the
right-hand side vector, from Lemma 6 it follows that,
for each i ∈ N , there is a scalar Li > 0 such that
dist(y(t+ 1), X¯i) ≤ dist(y(t+ 1), X¯i(t))
+Li‖v¯(t)− vmean‖ for all t ≥ 0.
By letting t→∞ and using relations (37) and v¯(t)→
vmean (Assumption 5), we see that for all i ∈ N with
probability 1,
lim
t→∞ dist(y(t+ 1), X¯i) = 0. (38)
In view of relation (35), the sequence {y(t)} is
bounded with probability 1, so it has accumulation
points with probability 1. By relation (38), all accumu-
lation points of {y(t+ 1)} lie in the set X¯i for every
i ∈ N with probability 1. Therefore, the accumulation
points of {y(t)} must lie in the intersection ∩i∈N X¯i
with probability 1. Since ∩i∈N X¯i = C(vmean), we
conclude that all accumulation points of {y(t)} lie in
the core C(vmean) with probability 1. Furthermore,
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according to relation (35) we have that, for any point
z ∈ rintC(vmean), the accumulation points of the
sequences {y(t)} are at the same (random) distance
from z with probability 1. Since the accumulation
points are in the set C(vmean), it follows that {y(k)}
is convergent with probability 1 and its limit point
is in the core C(vmean) with probability 1. Now,
since ‖xi(t) − y(t)‖ → 0 with probability 1 for all i
(see (34)), the sequences {xi(t)}, i ∈ N , have the same
limit point as the sequence {y(t)}. Thus, the sequences
{xi(t)}, i ∈ N , converge to a common (random) point
in C(vmean) with probability 1.
Theorem 3 shows the convergence of the allocations
generated by the bargaining protocol in (31)–(33). The
convergence relies on the properties of the matrices
and the connectivity of the players’ neighbor graphs,
as reflected in Assumptions 3 and 4. It also critically
depends on the fact that the core of the average game
C(vmean) has dimension n − 1 and that all bounding
sets X¯i(t) and, hence the cores C(v¯(t)), lie in the same
hyperplane with probability 1, the hyperplane defined
through the constant value of the grand coalition.
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section, we report some numerical simula-
tions. We consider coalitional TU games with 3 play-
ers, so the number of possible nonempty coalitions is
m = 7. We consider two different scenarios as shown
respectively in rows I and II in Table I. The columns
of Table I enumerate the coalitions. In each scenario,
the characteristic functions vS(t) are generated inde-
pendently with identical uniform distribution over an
interval. Specifically, we suppose that the values of
single player coalitions {1} and {2} are uncertain
within the given interval. All the other coalitions’
values are fixed and equal to zero except for the grand
coalition, which has value 10 in both scenarios I and II.
The two scenarios differ in that the core C(vmax)
of the robust game is nonempty in scenario I and
empty in scenario II. For scenario I, we simulate the
convergence behavior of the bargaining protocol (17)–
(19) for the robust game, while for scenario II, we
simulate bargaining protocol (31)–(33) for the average
game.
For each scenario, we run 50 different Monte Carlo
trajectories each one having 100 iterations (the fig-
ures below show only the first 60 iterations). The
number of iterations is chosen long enough to show
the convergence of the protocols. All plots include
v{1} v{2} v{3} v{i,j} for all i, j v{1,2,3}
I [4, 7] [0, 3] 0 0 10
II [4, 9] [0, 5] 0 0 10
TABLE I
COALITIONS’ VALUES FOR THE TWO SIMULATIONS SCENARIOS.
the sampled average and sampled variance for the 50
trajectories that were simulated. Each trajectory in each
scenario is generated by starting with the same initial
allocations, which are given by x1(0) = [10 0 0]′,
x2(0) = [0 10 0]′, and x3(0) = [0 0 10]′. The sampled
average is computed for each time t = 1, . . . , 100,
by fixing the time t and computing the average value
of the 50 trajectory sample values for that time. The
sampled variance is computed as the variance of the
samples with respect to their sampled average.
Regarding the players’ neighbor-graphs, we assume
that the graphs are deterministic but time-varying. The
graphs for the times t = 0, 1, 2 are as follows: player
2 and 3 connected at time t = 0 (see Figure 4(a)), then
player 3 and 1 connected at time t = 1 (Figure 4(b)),
and finally player 1 and 2 connected at time t = 3 (Fig-
ure 4(c)). These graphs are then repeated consecutively
in the same order. In this way, the players’ neighbor-
graph is connected every 3 time units (Assumption 4
is satisfied with Q = 2).
The matrices that we associate with these three
graphs, are respectively given by:
A(0) =
 1 0 00 12 12
0 12
1
2
 , A(1) =
 12 0 120 1 0
1
2 0
1
2
 ,
A(2) =
 12 12 01
2
1
2 0
0 0 1
 .
These matrices are also repeated in the same order for
the rest of the time. Thus, at any time t, the matrix A(t)
is doubly stochastic, with positive diagonal, and every
positive entry bounded below by 12 , so Assumption 3
is satisfied with α = 12 . All simulations are carried out
with MATLAB on an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo, CPU
P8400 at 2.27 GHz and a 3GB of RAM. The run time
of each simulation is around 90 seconds.
A. Simulation Scenario I
In this scenario, the coalitions’ values are generated
as given in row I of Table I. In particular, at each
v1
v2 v3
(a)
v1
v2 v3
(b)
v1
v2 v3
(c)
Fig. 4. Topology of players’ neighbor-graph at three distinct
times t = 0, 1 and 2.
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time t, the value v{1}(t) is chosen randomly in the
interval [4, 7] with uniform probability independently
of the other times. Similarly, the values v{2}(t) are
generated in the interval [0, 3]. The grand coalition
value is fixed to 10 at all times, and the other coalition
values are 0. With this data, we consider the allocations
as generated by players i = 1, 2, 3 according to the
bargaining protocol in (17)–(19) for the robust game
as reported in Subsection V-A1. We then consider the
bargaining protocol in (31)–(33) for the average game
in Subsection V-A2.
1) Robust game: For this specific example, the
characteristic function vmax for the robust game is
obtained by considering the highest possible coalition
values (see row I of Table I), which results in vmax =
[7 3 0 0 0 0 10]′. The resulting core of the robust game
is given by
C(vmax) = {x ∈ R3 : x1 ≥ 7, x2 ≥ 3, x3 ≥ 0,
x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x3 ≥ 0,
x2 + x3 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 + x3 = 10}.
This core contains a single point, namely [7 3 0]′. To
ensure that v(t) = vmax infinitely often, as required
by Theorem 1 for the convergence of the protocol,
we adopt the following randomization mechanism. At
each time t = 1, . . . , 100, we flip a coin and if the
outcome is “head” (probability 1/2), the coalitions’
values v{1}(t) and v{2}(t) are extracted from the
intervals [4, 7] and [0, 3], respectively, with uniform
probability independently of the other times. If the
outcome of the coin flip is “tail”, then we assume that
the robust game realizes and take v(t) = vmax.
We next present the results obtained by the Monte
Carlo runs for the bargaining protocol in (17)–(19).
An illustration of a typical run with the allocations
generated in periods t = 0, 1, 2, 3 is shown below:
v(0) = [6.8 2.7 . . . 10]′
v(1) = [7 3 . . . 10]′
v(2) = [4.4 1.1 . . . 10]′
v(3) = [7 3 . . . 10]′
x1(0) = [10 0 0]′
x1(1) = [10 0 0]′
x1(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′
x1(3) = [7 1.5 1.5]′
x2(0) = [0 10 0]′
x2(1) = [0 5 5]′
x2(2) = [0 5 5]′
x2(3) = [2.5 3.75 3.75]′
x3(0) = [0 0 10]′
x3(1) = [0 5 5]′
x3(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′
x3(3) = [5 2.5 2.5]′.
Recall that the initial allocations of the players are
x1(0) = [10 0 0]′, x2(0) = [0 10 0]′, and
x3(0) = [0 0 10]′. At time t = 1, bargaining
involves player 2 and 3 who update the allocations
respectively as x2(1) = [0 5 5]′ and x3(1) = [0 5 5]′.
These allocations are feasible for their bounding sets
so the projections on these sets are not performed. At
time t = 2, the bargaining involves player 1 and 3
who update their allocations, respectively, as x1(2) =
Fig. 5. Sampled average (left) and variance (right) of players’
allocations xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 for bargaining protocol (17)–(19) and
the robust game associated with the data in row I of Table I. Sampled
averages of the allocations xi(t) converge to the same point x˜ =
[7 3 0]′ ∈ C(vmax), while sampled variances go rapidly to zero.
Fig. 6. Sampled average (left) and sampled variance (right) of the
errors ei(t), i = 1, 2, 3, for the bargaining protocol (17)–(19) and
the robust game associated with the data in row I of Table I. Sampled
averages and the variances of the errors ei(t) converge to zero.
[5 2.5 2.5]′ and x3(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′. Again, these
allocations are feasible for their bounding sets and the
projections are not performed. Finally, at time t = 3,
the bargaining involves player 1 and 2 who update
their allocations resulting in x1(3) = [7 1.5 1.5]′ and
x2(3) = [2.5 3.75 3.75]′. Notice that x1(3) is obtained
after player 1 projects onto his bounding set.
In Figures 5 and 6, we report our simulation results
for the average of the sample trajectories obtained by
Monte Carlo runs. Figure 5 shows the sampled average
and variance of the allocations xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 per
iteration t. In accordance with the convergence result
of Theorem 1, the sampled averages of the players’
allocations xi(t) converge to the same point, namely
x = [7 3 0]′ which is in the core of the robust game
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Fig. 7. Sampled averages (left) and variances (right) of players’
allocations xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3, obtained by bargaining protocol (31)–
(33) for the average game associated with the data in row I of
Table I. Sampled averages converge to point x˜ = [5.6 2.2 2.2]′ ∈
C(vmean), which is the average of the limit points of the 50-sample
trajectories.
C(vmax). Figure 6 shows that the sample average and
sampled variance of the errors ei(t) converge to 0, as
expected in view of Lemma 3(b).
2) Average game: For scenario I data as given in
row I of Table I, we consider the average TU game
and its corresponding bargaining protocol (31)–(33).
We have vmean = [5.5 1.5 0 0 0 0 10]′ and the core
C(vmean) given by
C(vmean) = {x ∈ R3 : x1 ≥ 5.5, x2 ≥ 1.5, x3 ≥ 0,
x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x3 ≥ 0,
x2 + x3 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 + x3 = 10}.
In Figure 7 we depict our simulation results for
bargaining protocol (31)–(33) for the average game.
Figure 7 shows that the sampled average of the allo-
cations xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 converge to a common point
x˜ = [5.6 2.2 2.2]′ which belongs to the core C(vmean)
of the average game, as guaranteed by Theorem 3.
The sampled variance does not converge to zero as
the common limit point of the allocations xi(t) can be
different for different runs.
B. Simulation Scenario II
Here, we report the simulation results obtained by
the bargaining protocol (31)–(33) for the average game
corresponding to the data in row II of Table I. In this
case the core of the robust game is empty, so we do
not consider the robust game. The average game has
characteristic function vmean = [6.5 2.5 0 0 0 0 10]′ and
its core is
C(vmean) = {x ∈ R3 : x1 ≥ 6.5, x2 ≥ 2.5, x3 ≥ 0,
x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x3 ≥ 0,
x2 + x3 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 + x3 = 10}.
Figure 8 shows the results for the average game
obtained in our simulations. In Figure 8, we report
the sampled averages of the players’ allocations xi(t),
i = 1, 2, 3, obtained by bargaining protocol (31)–
(33). In accordance with Theorem 3, the players’
allocations converge to an allocation that lies in the
core C(vmean) of the average game, precisely to the
point x˜ = [6.6 2.6 0.8]′ ∈ C(vmean). Here, again, the
sampled variance of the allocations does not diminish
as the limit point is different for different runs.
Fig. 8. Sampled averages (left) and variances (right) of the
players’ allocations xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 obtained by the bargaining
protocol (31)–(33) for the average game associated with the data
in row II of Table I. Sampled averages converge to point x˜ =
[6.6 2.6 0.8]′ ∈ C(vmean), which is the average of the limit points
of the 50-sample trajectories.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
For a sequence of TU games, each with a random
characteristic function, we design a decentralized allo-
cation process defined over a communication graph of
players. The proposed bargaining scheme is proven to
converge, with probability 1, in either a robust game
setting or an average game setting, under mild assump-
tions on the communication topology and the stochastic
properties of the random characteristic function. The
key properties that distinguish this work from the
existing work on dynamic games are: (1) the introduc-
tion of a time-varying communication graph, termed
players’ neighbor-graph, over which the bargaining
protocol takes place; and (2) the distributed bargaining
protocol for players’ allocation updates subject to local
information exchange with neighboring players.
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